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ABSTRACT:
This article focuses on the influence of the educational policies of the French Third Republic 
and the conceptions of citizenship that were implied in the reshaping of primary education. 
Particular attention is paid to the way children, as future citizens, were being addressed and 
‘moulded’ through the then popular education practices, against the background of a severe 
assimilationist language policy and a fierce battle against religious institutions. The article ex-
plores efforts to turn migrants into ‘good’ French citizens, giving special notice to the situa-
tion of the children of Belgian migrants. Despite the huge presence of Belgian — i.e. mainly 
Flemish1 — immigrants in the industrial centres of Northern France, no special educational 
measures were taken to ‘adapt’ the Flemish, non-native speakers to their new situation. The 
authors explain the political and educational backgrounds to the reasons behind, and the con-
sequences of this approach, which could be characterized as a kind of ‘purposeful educational 
neglect’.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article traite de l’influence de la politique gouvernementale d’éducation en France sous la 
Troisième République et des notions de citoyenneté intégrées à la refonte de l’enseignement 
primaire. Les auteurs s’intéressent particulièrement au discours destiné aux enfants en tant que 
futurs citoyens et à la manière dont ils sont façonnés selon les pratiques éducatives en usage, 
dans le contexte d’une stricte politique d’assimilation linguistique et d’une guerre menée contre 
les institutions religieuses. L’article explore les efforts de transformation des immigrants en 
« bons » citoyens français, visant en particulier les enfants des migrants belges. Malgré une pré-
sence importante de migrants provenant de la Belgique — en majorité des Flamands — dans les 
centres industriels du nord de la France, aucune mesure n’est prise pour aider cette population 
non francophone à s’adapter. Les auteurs expliquent les contextes politique et scolaire de cette 
décision, les raisons sous-jacentes ainsi que les conséquences d’une approche que l’on pourrait 
qualifier de ‘lacune pédagogique intentionnelle’.
From the French Revolution onwards, the French school system has been assigned 
the task of advancing the unity of the nation, in the light of the ideals voiced by 
Condorcet (1743–1794), as a member of the National Assembly, of la promotion 
de tous.2 His belief in reason and the acquisition of knowledge as a remedy against 
social injustice and inequality constituted the foundation of his conception of an 
all-embracing, comprehensive, state-directed educational system. Ignorance was con-
ceived to be a limitation of freedom, schooling to be an individual right. Educational 
institutions were entrusted with the task of bringing about the unity of the nation. 
As is the case with most revolutionary claims, the complexity and obstinacy — and 
at that time also the turbulence — of social and historical reality were too unyielding 
for these imagined ideals to materialize immediately. But under Napoleon’s rule, at 
least one central revolutionary idea was being implemented: the organization and 
administration of schooling were being placed fully under the authority of the state.3 
In practice, however, this system fell short of achieving popular education for the 
masses as conceived by the revolutionaries. Later on, with the laws of Guizot (1833) 
and Falloux (1850), the monopoly of the state in educating the populace was weak-
ened through the formal acknowledgement of the right of the Catholic Church to set 
up its own schools. The French had to await the arrival on the scene of Jules Ferry, 
with his famous and far-reaching laws of 1881 and 1882, for a radical breakthrough 
in popular education.4 By making primary schooling compulsory, free and secular, 
he transformed the educational landscape of France, as the vigorous centralistic poli-
cies of the Third Republic forcefully reclaimed the power and educational influence 
of the state (also in view of the colonial expansion which emerged during the Third 
Republic).5
As a general and crucial background for the questions concerning the Flemish 
immigrants, we will focus in more detail on the influence of the general and edu-
cational policies of the Third Republic and the specific conceptions of citizenship 
that were implied in the reshaping of primary — or popular — education. We will 
concentrate on the way children — as future citizens — were being addressed6 and 
‘moulded’ through the then popular education practices, against the background of a 
severe assimilationist language policy and a fierce battle against religious institutions, 
eventually giving way to the separation of Church and State in 1905. Apparently, the 
rigour, fervour and ambition of the Republicans during the last decades of the nine-
teenth and the beginning of the twentieth century had far-reaching consequences 
for French society of the time and its conceptions of schooling, consequences that 
reverberate to today.
Schooling Society and Education of the Masses
Despite the fact that in certain circles of the leading classes in several European 
countries, there was strong initial resistance to the Enlightenment idea of an edu-
cated populace — ignorance constituting the best guarantee for social stability7 — by 
the end of the 19th century general compulsory schooling became more common.8 
Education was conceived to be one of the central means for the socialization of the 
23Articles/Articles
masses in light of the creation of nation states throughout Western Europe, often 
accompanying increasing urbanization. This shift of mentality and the generaliza-
tion of schooling through compulsory education were also driven by economic and 
political motives, including the rivalry among the various countries and the craving 
for emancipation on the part of the labourers, indicating that educational change 
could not be construed simply as a straightforward top-down mechanism.9 In Europe 
it was Prussia that led the way in the imposition of compulsory education. Most 
advanced European countries introduced universal compulsory schooling in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.10 Although it is apparently the case that the majority 
of the children voluntarily attended school before the enactment of compulsion in 
most states, various conceptions of the ‘Good Citizen’ — transforming a potentially 
dissident population into civilians conforming to the established order framed by a 
national perspective — underlay the move towards the provision of mass, popular, 
and finally compulsory education.11 According to Brian Simon, in reference to the 
ideas of Adam Smith,
[F]or the creation of a nation, the mass of individuals, concerned only with 
their own affairs, needed to be transformed into a cohesive force, conforming 
to national needs; and it is this which underlies the general movement to pop-
ular systems of education in the 19th and early 20th centuries.12
Similarly, Jurgen Herbst notes the roots of the public school revival in the middle 
of the 19th century, indicating that education had both custodial and formative func-
tions, and he evokes the apprehension concerning the children of immigrants in 
this regard: “The very diversity of ethnic background, the absence or strangeness of 
religious traditions, the variety of languages and dialects spoken, and the apparent 
crudity of lifestyles prompted many residents of Western cities to demand that these 
newcomers and their children be converted to the ways of the established citizenry.”13 
So although motivations for this undoubtedly multilayered social movement might 
have been diverse, mass, popular and finally compulsory schooling clearly had pri-
marily a socialisation function, and related to this — with growing urbanization and 
the disruption of the traditional social habitus — a custodial function.14 Against the 
background of this twofold concern, there emerged a wide consensus that all citizens 
should have access to at least a basic form of culture and knowledge, i.e. to popular 
education or schooling.15
Consequently, education and schooling were seen as a vital constituent of the 
ideological state apparatus, in the context of which the centralist administration of 
France served as an outstanding example. Whereas in the old estates society model of 
the Christian world where non-voluntaristic intermediary bodies between the in-
dividual and the centres of sovereignty in the last resort related to a divine source, 
in the newly emerging modern model, with a direct relationship between state and 
individual, the individual was, for the first time, genuinely conceived and defined as 
citizen.16 The emergent conception of citizenship within the social entity was being 
defined through a very powerful ideology, akin to the traditional religious mythology, 
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whereby the rational and rationalizing myth of education and schooling was posited 
as the sole instrument of socialization of this new, transformed locus of sovereignty. 
Such an educational system operated in essence as a ritual instrument for the con-
struction of the individualized citizen, i.e. of this molecule of the modern nation 
state, rather than as a conduit of particular skills for some or other economic func-
tion.17 In the context of the French polity of the Third Republic, the école laïque 
was the cornerstone of its political legitimacy,18 essentially related to a ‘constitutive 
outside’ formed by all kinds of dangers that could threaten its stability or its legiti-
mizing principles. With the setback of the Franco-Prussian war freshly in mind, Jules 
Ferry combined explicit national motives with an outspoken secular ideology and 
particular social-economic motives, in order to confront everything that threatened 
the republican legitimacy and the spiritual unity of the nation.19 Universal suffrage 
was in need of pedagogical guidance. In what follows we will explore aspects of the 
background of the republican project and its educational manifestations.
Social Upheaval, the Grand German Example and the Emergence of 
Anticlericalism
Il faut faire disparaître le mal, cause de tous les maux, l’ignorance d’où sor-
tent alternativement le despotisme et la démagogie […] Oui, on peut établir 
preuves en main que c’est l’infériorité de notre éducation qui nous a conduits 
aux revers. Nous avons été battus par des adversaires qui ont mis de leur côté la 
prévoyance, la discipline et la science: ce qui prouve, derrière ce mal, que même 
dans le conflits de la force matérielle, c’est l’intelligence qui reste maîtresse.20
 — Léon Gambetta, 26 June 1871
The transition year 1870–1871 resonated as a terrible year in the French historical 
consciousness.21 The defeat of the Second Empire and the Prussian occupation had 
dethroned many long-cherished ideals. Apparently, the French élan did not in all cir-
cumstances provide sufficient compensation for technical inferiority. There was much 
intellectual discord as to the precise cause of the humiliation of France, but there was 
general agreement that the Empire was the chief culprit with regard to the evil that 
had taken place.22 Unmistakably, one of the most striking and pronounced political 
facts was the ever-growing conflict between the Republicans and the Catholics, with 
rising radicalization and extremism in education discourse especially towards the end 
of the 1970s.23 The steadfast inflexibility of both Rome and France made any com-
mon agreement or settlement impossible.
There was the important and near unanimous conviction among the French elite 
that the triumph of Prussia had everything to do with the superiority of the former’s 
renowned universities and schools. In addition, the French realized that the German 
officers were far better trained, if only because of their superior ability to read maps 
properly and their ability to speak and understand French. Immediately, the question 
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emerged as to how the superiority in knowledge of the victors had come about, lead-
ing the French press to compare the respective educational systems of France and 
Germany. This comparison brought to light, among other things, that the school-
teachers of Alsace-Lorraine had received better training than their French colleagues 
and that, in addition, the German system was free of charge. A growing number of 
people began to support the view that if the French wanted to demonstrate that their 
schooling system was capable of achieving the same successes, it had to undertake 
equally radical reforms.24
The French admiration for German schooling covered all levels of the educa-
tional system and would lead to a far-ranging influence in didactics and pedagogical 
methods, albeit mediated via Belgium and Switzerland, applied in a more practical 
vein, and adapted to the French context.25 Victor Duruy26 and others had previously 
praised German superiority in education, and the political defeat of 1870 revived 
arguments in favour of the German system. The belief that national zeal could and 
should be fuelled through education was an underlying principle in virtually all pro-
posals for reform during the following decades. Accordingly, the Republicans imme-
diately came up with educational reform plans to counterbalance the weaknesses that 
were revealed during the recent debacle. Jules Ferry, not yet minister, strongly em-
phasized that the work of the Revolution of 1789 could never be completed if the last 
of inequalities — that of the right to knowledge — was not removed. Consequently, 
from 1871 on, one of the central themes of the republican campaign was the secular 
struggle against ignorance, as befitted the grandeur of the French nation.
Léon Gambetta, Minister of the Interior and of Foreign affairs in the period 
1870–1871 and reform-minded prime minister of France from 1881–1882, insisted 
that schooling should be public and secular, and not be entrusted to the clergy, which 
had very little affinity with modern society.27 Schooling should inculcate the minds 
of future citizens with the conviction that the French nation was superior in the field 
of legislation, civilization and republican institutions. In keeping with the prevail-
ing social values, the unity of the various classes had to be pursued, and all conflicts 
potentially threatening to national unity had to be eliminated or precluded. Since 
Catholicism — or religious unity, for that matter — was no longer a general feature 
of French society, a new moral unity had to be forged, by means of a uniform school 
system, teaching civil morality in accordance with the principles of natural reason. 
The overall aim was to instill conduct deeply imbued with a strong devotion to the 
nation and a readiness to take up one’s civic responsibilities. The appeal of the educa-
tional reformers and the values they advocated were favourably received by a growing 
audience and fell on fertile ground especially among the schoolteachers, who reacted 
with enthusiasm to Gambetta’s call and declared, as it were, nationalism as a secular 
religion while perceiving themselves as apostles of this national mission.28
The educational impact of the political defeat was felt most thoroughly at the 
level of primary education, this being the most appropriate field for the transforma-
tion of mass consciousness. At the same time, one of the prime influences of the 
German example and its observed superiority was the growing importance of scien-
tific research, particularly the way in which the study of history was being harnessed 
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to foster historical awareness.29 As a consequence, the aim became to ‘apply’ the 
German model to the French universities. Nevertheless, after many French students 
had stayed in Germany to study at its universities, their appreciation of the educa-
tional system there diminished. This happened, in part, because the shock effect of 
the debacle with Prussia began to wane and the quality of French higher education 
started to improve. When the dispute of the 1870s between the Republicans and the 
Catholics about the competence of the latter to confer academic grades was eventu-
ally settled by the law of 18 March 1880, formally prohibiting Catholic universities 
from conferring grades any longer, the way was paved for the most significant educa-
tional reforms of the Third Republic, during the ministry of Jules Ferry. Indeed, to-
wards the mid 1870s religious thinking had already become considerably discredited 
among the French intelligentsia. Science, with its strict rational methods, was held to 
provide the key to all problems that humanity encountered. To this end, theological 
dogma had to be renounced.
Therefore, political divisions that had characterized France since 1870 implied 
that public educational reforms were entwined in the conflict with the Church, and 
included different views about the role of the state.30 Between 1808 and 1880, most 
Catholics, apart from a few extremists, had acknowledged the supervisory role of the 
state in educational affairs. The fact that the state had set up its own institutions was 
never contested, on condition that private education could enjoy the same privileges. 
At the same time, until then, in non-Catholic milieus, with the exception of some 
anti-religious extremists, theoretical principles were not held to be absolute and the 
system of independent private schools, which developed alongside the state system, 
was accepted. With the republican electoral victory of 1879, however, the claim of 
state omnipotence in education was strongly asserted.
By the end of the 1870s, reproaches heaped upon the Church were increasing. 
Even more than the fact that the congregations arrogated so much state money, it 
was the exceptionally dominant influence of the Catholics in (public) education that 
stirred the growing resentment. Therefore, the neutrality that was supposed to char-
acterize secular state schools in practice often proved to be very relative, especially 
in secondary education. But in spite of religious supremacy in education, secular 
ideas and convictions gradually became more widespread among large sections of 
the population. This mental ‘laicisation’ (i.e. secularization), in conjunction with the 
new political situation, the unbridled increase of religious congregations, and the 
problems in education, created a social climate that ultimately turned out to be a 
fertile breeding ground for the emerging republican struggle. Yet, the nation still 
required someone who could personify this struggle in the domain of education and 
schooling, and this figure appeared in the form of Jules Ferry, a vigorous champion 
of democracy and social equality.
According to Compère,31 the French historiography of education generally has 
mythologized and emphasized the progressive and democratic educational contribu-
tion of Ferry. It is only with the works of historians such as Willem Frijhoff32 and 
Maurice Crubellier33 that a more cultural historical approach towards the process of 
schooling in the Third Republic has emerged.34 In relation to the work of Crubellier, 
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Compère states: “Avec l’essai de Maurice Crubellier, il s’agit d’une histoire culturelle, 
c’est-à-dire qu’au delà des programmes et des règles internes, le livre cherche à explic-
iter le projet global qui le commande et les moyens mobilisés pour y parvenir. Cette 
école de Jules Ferry, conçue pour produire des citoyens dignes de la République, était 
animée par une volonté quasi totalitaire de forger l’homme nouveau, rationaliste et 
patriote, à l’image des pères fondateurs du régime qui ne s’est — heureusement — pas 
intégralement imposée.”35
Jules Ferry, ‘L’obligation, La Gratuité et La Laïcité’, and Popular Education
In fact, the policy of Jules Ferry, the intellectual father and emblematic symbol of the 
educational laws from the early 1880s, should be conceived as anticlerical rather than 
antireligious. As a positivist, he assumed that after some time religion would fade 
away as a matter of course, and his attitude was in a way pragmatic (and empirical) 
rather than solely rooted in a radical ideology.36 At a certain stage he even supported 
Cardinal Lavigerie in setting up religious schools in the North African colonies.37 
After all, the republican leaders that had broken the détente between Church and 
State, dating back to the Guizot law of 1833, were not vehement haters of religion, 
but were returning to the tradition of the members of parliament of the 18th century, 
whose main objective was to restrict the Catholic influence on French public life as 
much as possible. The Republicans associated Catholic schools with the reactionary 
Right, which was obviously not in keeping with how they conceived of the ideal 
schooling of the future leaders of society.
Because the republican elite initially did not represent the general population, and 
since the majority of the French still perceived themselves in one way or another as 
Catholics, the moderate Republicans initially restricted themselves to indirect attacks 
on the congregations and their schools. At the same time, the Republicans concen-
trated on ‘strengthening’ the universities by trying to exclude individuals who did 
not subscribe to their secular views, in order to allow them to become genuine state 
institutions. Only after the Dreyfus affair, from 1894 onwards, did the more radical 
version of republicanism come into full prominence.38
In any case, the elections of 14 October 1877, that preceded the appointment of 
Jules Ferry as Minister of Education in February 1879, heralded a period of reform 
that would last for about three decades. The election victory of the Republicans and 
their majority in Chamber and Senate led to the general acceptance of the urgent 
project to reorganize the laicized society. Among the initiatives deemed necessary to 
achieve this end, education and schooling emerged as the most vital ones.39 It was 
here that the seeds were sown for all the great reforms on the educational and aca-
demic landscape that would follow, and in which Jules Ferry would play a major role.
In a way, the efforts of Jules Ferry for primary education can be considered as 
the crowning of almost a century of efforts to provide minimal schooling for every 
French citizen. The two most memorable laws implemented by Jules Ferry were 
the law of 16 June 1881, making primary education free of charge, and that of 
28 March 1882, which deemed all public education secular, and simultaneously 
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made schooling compulsory for all children from the age of 6 up to the age of 13.40 
The decision to make primary or popular education free, with a law that in fact 
had been preceded by a long build-up, was based on Ferry’s philosophy that the 
government had the absolute duty to provide primary education for every child in 
France, so that primary education was conceived as a principal right. This right, 
though, could not be claimed with regard to secondary education, on the grounds 
that only those pupils who were deemed capable were entitled to it, and ultimately 
able to use their schooling to harness their talents in service of society. Article 1 of 
the law of 1882 also made instruction in history and geography compulsory, both 
of central importance for national and civic instruction. Other obligatory curricular 
elements concerned notions of law and economy, agriculture, industry and manual 
labour, drawing, music and gymnastics — and for boys also military training. With 
the disappearance of religion from the curriculum, the right of the clergy to super-
vise primary education institutions ended. An important creed of Jules Ferry was the 
conviction that science and democracy went hand in hand, and that the spread of 
knowledge and insight through education would enable people to become rational 
and responsible citizens.41 At the same time, Ferry’s laws corresponded with the 
growing general appreciation for education and schooling, as the population became 
aware of the necessity and value of literacy. Nevertheless, the laws of Jules Ferry 
implied more of a qualitative than a quantitative change in education, and were 
in a way a kind of formal crystallization of societal processes that had been going 
on for some time.42 In addition, making popular education free of charge was less 
innovative than it appeared, given the fact that religious congregations had always 
offered free primary education (though they accepted donations); this reform, argu-
ably, could be interpreted as a strategic move to check Catholic schools rather than 
as a noble effort to universalize schooling.
Later in the 1880s, two other laws would complete primary education reform, one 
of which was the law of October 1886 from René Goblet, a successor of Jules Ferry. 
This law clearly demarcated the distinction between private and public education, 
gave further shape to the laicization of public education personnel, tackled some 
problems concerning inspection, and sharpened training conditions for the opening 
of an école maternelle. It prescribed that only laymen were allowed to teach in public 
education, and demanded a state brevet as a condition to teach. Eventually, it would 
be the law of 1886 that dealt the biggest blow to the congregations. Male clergymen 
were replaced systematically within five years, religious females as soon as practical 
circumstances made it possible. The law of 19 July 1889 turned all schoolteachers of-
ficially into civil servants — a logical consequence of a development that increasingly 
conceived of education as a national service.
The most thorough influence of Jules Ferry’s measures lay in primary education, 
conceived as l’enseignement populaire, popular education aimed at all layers of society, 
i.e. education as a democratic lever.43 Accordingly, primary education reform could 
be considered as the mainstay on which all other reforms were built. Public primary 
education became a vital means of support for the state system, delivering the per-
sonnel that could instruct the French youth in the national republican ideology. And 
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although, as Paul Goalen has written,44 the impact of such schooling can be difficult 
to assess and its results can be contradictory, it is clear that its influence was enor-
mous, and the structure and content of primary education as established during the 
1880s remained virtually unmodified until the Second World War. It was not until 
the beginning of the Fifth Republic that the curriculum underwent a substantial revi-
sion. The reason for this was quite simple. Popular education was being considered 
as a separate entity, reserved for the masses, not intended to lead to further study, 
but with the chief aim — during these seven years — of providing the pupils with the 
basic skills that sufficed to make it through the rest of their lives. As a consequence, 
it was long characterized by a very basically conceived ‘encyclopaedic’ or ‘drill-like’ 
mindset, showing little need to adapt itself to changing societal conditions.
State, Citizenship and the Presence of (Belgian/Flemish) Migrants
In light of the traditional French difference between jus sanguinis (‘right of blood’) 
and jus soli (‘right of the soil’), the expansiveness of French citizenship vis-à-vis im-
migrants has strong roots in the jus soli approach, introduced for third-generation 
immigrants in 1851 and extended to cover second-generation immigrants in 1889.45 
The system of 1889 still remains in place today and had ideological and political 
grounds rather than demographic or military ones, clearly epitomized by the way 
citizenship was conceived of during the Third Republic.46 In this context it not only 
makes sense to explain the consequences that Third Republic policies might have 
had for immigrants, Belgians or others, but also to turn the problem around and 
shed some light on dimensions that might clarify the relation between republican 
political ideology and certain elements of political resentment that speeded up and 
incited this ideology. According to Brubaker,47 the crux of the problem was the politi-
cized resentment in frontier departments, concerning the exemption of long-settled 
foreigners from military service. Obviously, the département du Nord, close to the 
border with Belgium and with a very strong presence of Belgian — again, mainly 
Flemish — settlers, was exemplary in this regard, not in the least as far as the in-
dustrial region of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing was concerned. The impulse behind the 
extension of jus soli, according to Brubaker, was social resentment, not demographic 
or military concern, a resentment that intensified in the 1870s, as the military induc-
tion rate increased among French males, and especially in the 1880s, during which 
Republican doctrines of universal and equal military service gained ground. In other 
words, resentment of the privileged situation of established immigrants led to a more 
inclusive definition of citizenship. Quoting Brubaker: “The decisive extension of jus 
soli in 1889 can be explained only with reference to a distinctively state-centred and 
assimilationist understanding of nationhood, deeply rooted in political and cultural 
geography and powerfully reinforced in the 1880s by the Republican program of 
universal primary education and universal military service.”48 Consequently, a state-
centred and assimilationist idiom of nationhood, despite the incipient emergence 
of a more ethnocultural counteridiom, was reinforced and activated in a particular 
historical, institutional, and political context.
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This idiom of nationhood then shaped perceptions and judgements about what 
was in the interest of the state. The establishment of universal conscription and free, 
compulsory and secular primary — or popular — education were crucial in the con-
text of this particular sequence of institutional reform, in a period of republican as-
cendancy during which the citizenship law reform occurred. Thus the traditional id-
iom of nationhood — state-centred and assimilationist — was powerfully reinforced, 
in the light of which popular education was being considered as a vital transforming 
force.49 The exclusion from citizenship and (accordingly) from military service of 
French second- and third-generation immigrants was perceived as anomalous and 
intolerable. It was in that light that turning them into Frenchmen came to be per-
ceived as desirable and that their civic and military incorporation via naturalization 
was increasingly being advocated.
France’s insistent policy of assimilation, particularly in educational matters, had 
considerable implications for the children of Flemish immigrants. Again, in the 
words of Brubaker: “[T]o permit French-born children of foreigners to claim French 
citizenship as a matter of right was to expand and strengthen the nation, not to 
dilute its ethnocultural substance.”50 The resentment mentioned with regard to the 
discrepancy between the duties of foreign versus ‘native’ men indicates that Flemish 
migrants played an important role in the realization of the new naturalization law. 
Since the Flemish constituted the majority of foreigners in France at the time, it was 
largely their exemption of military service which incited the social unease about the 
perceived injustice. At the same time, the ease with which foreigners were turned 
into Frenchmen as a consequence of this law shows the lack of emphasis on common 
descent as a criterion of French nationhood.51 Besides, and by way of comparison, 
Brubaker contrasts the typical French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship 
(i.e. the institutional and territorial frame of the state, political unity preponderat-
ing over shared culture) with the traditional German pre-political idea of the nation 
(“conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic, cultural, 
linguistic or racial community — as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft”).52 In 
this analysis, in the French idiom, nationhood is constituted by political unity and “is 
centrally expressed in the striving for cultural unity,” emphasizing the French faith in 
the assimilatory workings of school and army, while in the German understanding, 
“nationhood is constituted by ethnocultural unity and expressed in political unity.”53 
Obviously, the multi-hued vicissitudes of ever-shifting historical configurations do 
not allow for too much binary thinking or analytical essentialism, and certainly in the 
context of its colonial education policy, this characterization of the French republican 
idiom might be in need of some deconstruction.54 Yet, as a general scheme Brubaker’s 
distinction seems fairly relevant and cogent.
The Assimilationist Leitmotiv, Schooling and the Children of Flemish 
Immigrants
The assimilationist leitmotiv has a long tradition in France. But the republican as-
similationism of the 1880s was of a particular kind. It was no longer mere residence 
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or work in France that were held to be the central assimilating elements, but partici-
pation in the newly republicanized and nationalized institutions of school and army. 
By the end of the decade, l’école obligatoire was not only a principle but, to a large 
extent, a reality, subjecting foreign — and thus Flemish — as well as French children 
to its powerfully assimilationist regime. The transition to secular education had both 
a ‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ aspect. As indicated earlier, the general laicization of pri-
mary education not only implied the elimination of religious instruction from the 
classroom and members of religious orders from the ranks of schoolteachers, it also 
meant replacing religious with civic training and substituting the heavenly father and 
fatherland with the earthly state and fatherland. The laicization of education was 
crucially intertwined with a laicization of morals, and schooling was standardized 
throughout the national territory, from teacher-training in the normal schools to 
textbooks, such as the history and civics manuals of Ernest Lavisse.55 The nation also 
was at the heart of the intellectual and moral curriculum of the schools, instruction in 
history and geography making the nation a central cognitive and moral category. In 
this context, school and army reinforced each other, whereby the traditional French 
belief in the assimilatory virtues of the territory and its institutions acquired a par-
ticular republican tinge through the aforementioned powerful and specifically repub-
lican confidence in the assimilatory virtues of school and army. If second-generation 
immigrants were already subjected to the assimilatory workings of the school, the 
extension of jus soli would, in addition, subject them to the assimilatory workings 
of the army — the army being conceived as the second school for patriotism. In the 
words of Annie Crépin, who has studied extensively the history of the French army, 
including the relation between military conscription and citizenship:
Le service, tel qu’il était conçu par les hommes de la IIIème République, ne 
concourait pas seulement à renforcer un instrument de guerre, il était surtout 
un des fondements de l’unité nationale et le ciment de la citoyenneté, droit et 
devoir confondus. L’accomplissement du service était un des traits les plus sail-
lants de la citoyenneté. En revanche, être citoyen — et, partant, accepter de cet 
état — c’était être ou achever d’être français.56
In a way, the well-established dominant style of thinking and talking about citizen-
ship in relation to immigration, with its roots in the revolutionary period, crystallized 
during the 1880s, and has not since gone unchallenged.57 Through the civic incor-
poration of long-settled foreigners, the legal transformation was construed to be ac-
companied by a social transformation. Immigrants, in this understanding, would be 
transformed socially into Frenchmen through the assimilatory workings of compul-
sory schooling and universal military service, and in this view could also be redefined 
legally as Frenchmen. The nation was central to the moral and civic indoctrination 
characterizing the republican schools, and the events of 1914 showed that the delib-
erate and strenuous cultivation of patriotism inherent in it turned out to be very suc-
cessful indeed, since many descendants of Flemish and other immigrants vigorously 
defended the French flag during the First World War.58
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In order to understand how swiftly the process of assimilation and the eagerness of 
the Flemish to become ‘good’ French citizens occurred, one could point to the power, 
comprehensiveness and universality with which Jules Ferry and the Republicans 
had established their educational regime. In addition, as indicated, military service, 
especially from 1889 onwards, was of crucial importance. From the perspective 
of Flemish immigrants, other, more pragmatic factors, also played a role. For the 
Flemish workers in the Northern frontier region — mainly employed in the factories 
of Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing59 — adopting a certain level of ‘Frenchness’ was to a 
large extent a matter of mere survival, with regard to both language skills and public 
image in the context of the workers’ community.60 As a consequence, economic and 
social necessities had far-reaching cultural and identificational implications, the intri-
cate nuances of which are unfortunately hard to trace. While one could say that the 
first-generation Flemish immigrants still must have experienced strong ties with their 
homeland and therefore must have felt the need to maintain their culture of origin in 
one way or another, testimonies of descendants of Flemish immigrants show that for 
most of them their experience in Flanders was associated with misery, poverty, fam-
ine, child mortality, and so on.61 These memories, in turn, encouraged them to leave 
their past behind and instead focus on their future, i.e. their future as French citizens.
For the children of the first generation of Flemish, who did not have this tangible 
experience in Flanders and who were raised in France and immersed in the French 
language and educational system from the beginning, the assimilation process osten-
sibly took place even faster. Also, the fact that these children went to French schools 
strengthened the integration of their parents.62 In any case, the francisation of Flemish 
immigrants corresponded with a strong desire on the part of the Flemish to have a 
thorough command of the French language, often at the expense of maintaining their 
language of origin, especially from the second generation onwards.63 This — rather 
vital — aspect of assimilation was strengthened by the general prohibition on the use 
of Flemish or patois in the classroom or in the playground, a law passed in 1866 by 
Victor Duruy, who was Minister of Education from 1863–1869 and a strong advo-
cate of linguistic homogenization.64 So the general and centralistic political attempts 
to language homogenisation were complemented by the general and largely prag-
matically driven eagerness on the part of the Flemish to master the French language.
Accordingly, a central element encouraging a swift assimilation and integration of 
Flemish children in French schools concerned their eagerness to emulate their peers, 
making friends, and belong to the group. The challenge of having a different cultural 
background, owing to their parents’ history as migrants, likely made them even more 
subject to the gaze of French children. To take the example of primary education in 
Roubaix,65 which for decades was comprised of a majority of Belgian citizens, David, 
Guillemin and Waret, note: “Il y avait une véritable émulation a l’école, prévue de 
leur volonté d’intégration. L’école joue un grand rôle dans l’intégration, les ensei-
gnants ne faisaient pas de différence entre les élèves et les petits Flamands devaient 
s’accrocher. (Pas de classes d’adaption…).”66 A few pages further and in the same 
vein, they say: “[I]ls veulent à tout prix oublier leur langue, être au même niveau que 
les Français.”67
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The above quotations testify to the fact that no specific educational measures 
were taken with regard to the children of Flemish immigrants, and at the same time 
evoke both the children’s and parents’ eagerness to ‘become French.’ So the larger re-
publican assimilationist framework and the corresponding national institutional and 
educational context, went hand in hand with a number of pragmatic and emotional 
motives caused by the peculiar social position of the Flemish immigrants and their 
children, In addition, it is significant that Flemish, patois (local dialect) or Picard68 
were excluded from schooling; in the light of total linguistic immersion in French, 
other language idioms were pedagogically neglected.69 Furthermore, the combina-
tion of Ferry’s compulsory education law of 1882 and the naturalization law of 1889, 
accelerated the pace of integration. The enthusiasm with which the descendants of 
Flemish immigrants fought for France during the First World War, can be conceived 
as an outcome of this acceleration process and its preceding measures, attesting to 
the success of the systematic republican ambition to instill patriotic values and civic 
morals.70
Obviously, ‘the School of the Republic’ had become one of the most essential in-
stitutions of nation-building and the principal site for the inculcation of republican 
values, thereby initiating a process of national unification to forge the identity of 
French republican citizens and immigrants alike. ‘Interculturality’ in education, or 
‘addressing the migrant as other’ by paying heed to his/her particular cultural back-
ground was out of the question. This absence of the recognition of diversity relates to 
the conspicuous expansiveness or ‘stretchability’ of French citizenship. France might 
not be a classical country of immigration, but it certainly is a classical country, and 
according to Brubaker, perhaps the classical country, of assimilation,71 to which the 
story of the second- and third-generation Flemish immigrants patently bears witness. 
The case of the French Third Republic, and the case of the Flemish immigrants, for 
that matter, show that it is not sufficient to consider citizenship solely in its functional 
context, in terms of its contribution to the opportunities of immigrants or the exclu-
sionary capacities of the state. We must pay equal attention to the politico-cultural 
context,72 and as a consequence to education and schooling as its prime embodiment.
The idea that France can be conceived as the classical country of assimilation 
in many ways still resonates today. While immigration history in France has devel-
oped into a legitimate field of academic inquiry since the 1980s in the wake of the 
increased interest in socio-political history in the human sciences,73 this has not yet 
translated into a legitimate place in primary or secondary school curricula and/or 
within history classes. In this way, the curricular or educational neglect of immigra-
tion as a relevant and central element in French national cultural, social and political 
history directly or indirectly contributes to the sustained sentiment of illegitimacy 
experienced by a whole array of immigrant and minority groups within France.74 
The broad and explicit concern by primary schoolteachers about the education and 
integration of migrants, more or less from the 1970s onwards, was mainly related 
to the reception of North African immigrant families (predominantly from Algeria) 
and their children.75 Accordingly, in the following decades, immigration as a ‘theme’ 
in school almost solely imposed itself in response to momentary problems involving 
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pupils in the classroom, their families and their social/spatial replacements. To the 
extent than one can speak of a dimension of ‘interculturality’ in educational contexts 
during this period, this did not amount to much more than ‘tolerating foreigners or 
children of another culture in class’.76 As a consequence, immigration has never been 
dealt with as a proper subject of historical study in relation to France’s social and 
political history. In fact, this approach once more affirms French national history as 
it had always been,77 a history (teaching) in which immigration for most of the time 
has been notably absent, while actually immigration forms a vital, intrinsic and con-
stitutive part of French national history and culture, and as a consequence cannot be 
understood as some external or peripheral aspect of it.78
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